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Substitution of Alternate Jurors During Deliberations:
Constitutional and Procedural Considerations
The increasing prevalence of lengthy and complex trials,' and
the resulting rise in the opportunities for juror incapacitation or dis-
qualification, 2 has created a greater need for alternate jurors. Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure (FRCrimP) 24(c) 3 and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 47(b)4 allow courts to substitute alternate
jurors until deliberations begin. 5 A mistrial is likely to occur without
an available alternate juror to replace incapacitated or disqualified
I In 1979, there were 7,082 jury trials in the federal system, of which 84 lasted over 20
trial days, which is approximately one month of court time. Corby, The Right to Trialb Ju y,
4 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoCACY 65, 70 (1980). Cf. Kirkham, .Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83
F.R.D. 497, 501 (1979) (during both 1974 and 1975, 92 federal trials lasted 20 or more days).
From 1970 to 1978 the number of civil trials lasting longer than one month doubled. Chief
Justice Burger's Flagstaff Address, 48 U.S.L.W. 2118 (1979), reprintedin Burger, Can juries Cope
with Multi-Month Trials? 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 449, 450 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Burger's Flagstaff Address]. See also Hawkins, The Case for Trial byJuV1 in Complex Civil Litiga-
tion, 7 LITIGATION 15 (1980).
2 Chief Justice Burger has expressed his concern about the detrimental effect of a multi-
month trial on jurors. Burger's Flagstaff Address, supra note 1. See Ungar & Mann, The Jug
andthe Complex Civil Case, 6 LITIGATION 3, 4 (1980) (chandes are great that substitution will be
required; elderly dominate jury rolls). But cf. C. JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY 200 (1962)
(aged are not over-represented on juries).
3 The rule provides in part:
The court may direct that not more than 6 jurors in addition to the regular jury be
called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in
which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to
consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform
their duties. Alternatejurors hall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifxa-
tions, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall
have the same functions, powers, facilities andprivileges as the regular jurors. An alternate
juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires
to consider its verdict.
FRCrimP 24(c) (emphasis added).
4 FRCP 47(b) is identical to FRCrimP 24(c), supra note 3.
5 The federal system introduced the practice in criminal cases in 1932 and in civil cases
in 1938. The use of alternate jurors, the substitution of an alternate juror for ajuror, the time
of the substitution, and the procedure used to determine if a substitution should be made are
all at the court's discretion. See L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES §§ 24:101, :103-04, :202-04 (1966 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as L. OR.IELD]; 2
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 388, at 49, 50-51 (1969 & Supp. 1980)
(criminal) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2484, at 475-76 (1969) (civil) [hereinafter cited as MILLER]. See also
Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1944), aj'd, 324 U.S. 282 (1945)
(called a needed procedural reform).
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jurors during the trial.6
Concern for incapacitation and disqualification, however, does
not cease with the closing of the jury room door. A major shortcom-
ing of FRCrimP 24(c) and FRCP 47(b) is that neither rule provides
for substitution when a juror becomes incapacitated or disqualified
during deliberations. Although proposals for substitution during fed-
eral trial deliberations have been unsuccessful, 7 some states allow
substitution during deliberations. Two procedures are used: (1) the
alternate jurors remain separate from the deliberating jurors;" or
(2) the alternate jurors remain in the jury room during deliberations,
but are instructed not to participate. 9 This note analyzes these two
procedures. Part I examines whether the two procedures would vio-
late the federal rules of criminal and civil procedure; part II considers
the constitutional validity of the two procedures; and part III reviews
the current case law concerning the two procedures.
I. Federal Rules of Procedure
FRCrimP 24(c) and FRCP 47(b) require the discharge of alter-
nate jurors "after the jury retires to consider its verdict."' 0 States
6 See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377
(1956); L. ORFIELD, supra note 5, §'24:101; WRICHT, supra note 5, § 388, at 49 n.92; MILLER,
supra note 5, § 2484, at 475. The court does not always call a mistrial, because the defendant
may stipulate to a verdict by the remaining jurors or to the substitution of an alternate juror.
Mistrials have been characterized as the "poorest of all possible solutions." Report of Supreme
Court Committee on Criminal Procedure, 95 N.J.L.J. 1, 16 (Apr. 13, 1972) [hereinafter cited as NJ.
Supreme Court Committee Report).
7 Naff, Jug Trial, Waiver Thereof and the Alternate Juror, 22 Ky. L.J. 125, 137 (1933);
Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 46, 53 (1945) (Supreme Court
questioned the validity of substitution during deliberations and the committee dropped the
proposal); Paisley, The Federal Rule on Alternate Jurors, 51 A.B.A.J. 1044, 1045 (1965); Proceedings
of the Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 184, 189-90 (1945) (committee
dropped proposal providing for substitution during deliberations); Supplemental Report of the
Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit, 37 F.R.D. 71, 72, 74,
77 (1965) (pro-substitution in civil and criminal cases).
8 See People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 552 P.2d 742, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1976), cert.
denied, 492 U.S. 1077 (1977); Tanner v. State, 242 Ga. 437, 249 S.E.2d 238 (1978); Common-
wealth v. Haywood, Mass. Adv. Sh. 965 (Apr. 5, 1979); State v. Trent, 79 N.J. 251, 398 A.2d
1271 (1979).
9 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
948 (1978).
10 See notes 3 & 4 supra. See also Truscott v. Chaplin, 403 F.2d 644, 645 (3rd Cir. 1968)
(presence of alternate juror at jury's noon meal, but before the commencement of delibera-
tions, not reversible error and not violative of FRCP 47(b)).
The discharge of alternate jurors once deliberations begin is a mandatory requirement.
See, e.g., United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Allison,
481 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968), subsequent appeal sub nom. United States v. Nash, 414 F.2d 234 (2d
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that allow the substitution of alternate jurors during deliberations,
whether they have been present or absent during deliberations, do
not discharge alternate jurors until a verdict is reached. Thus, the
use of either procedure would be a violation of both FRCrimP 24(c)
and FRCP 47(b).1t
Of equal concern is whether juror substitution during delibera-
tions, or the presence of alternate jurors in the jury room during de-
liberations, results in more than twelve jurors. 2 FRCP 4813 allows
stipulations for juries of less than twelve, and does not state, as does
FRCrimP 23(b),' 4 that juries shall consist of twelve members. FRCP
48 implies that twelve jurors are the maximum, but such an implica-
tion is subject to debate.
In Colgrove v. Batlin, 5 the Supreme Court of the United States
upheld a local district court rule that, without requiring stipulation
by the parties, provided for six-member civil juries.16 The Court de-
termined that, because FRCP 48 rested on the drafters' mistaken be-
lief that the seventh amendment' 7 required a jury of twelve, the
rule's twelve-person jury implication was without support. As a re-
sult, the district court rule providing for six jurors in all civil cases
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969); United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565, 568 (S.D. Fla.
1979). See also WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 52 (FRCrimP 24(c)); MILLER, supra note 5, at 477
(FRCP 47(b)). Accord, Note, Criminal Procedure-Jug Tial-Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure Requires Discharge of Alternate Juror When Jug, Acts As Separate Entity, 19
WAYNE L. REv. 1605 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rule 24(c)].
11 See note 10 supra. For similar rulings on nearly identical state statutes, see note 200
and accompanying text infra. Further, FRCrimP 24(c) can be waived. See, e.g., United States
v. Allison, 481 F.2d at 472; United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. at 567, 573-74. The Fourth
Circuit has also found FRCrimP 24(c) inapplicable where a court reinstates a discharged
alternate juror. United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 1127 (4th Cir. 1980).
12 Courts have held that substitution during deliberations results in more than twelve
jurors. See notes 29 & 131 in/ra.
13 The rule provides: "The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any
number less than twelve or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall
be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury." FRCP 48.
14 The rule provides: "Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the parties may
stipulate in writing that with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any
number less than 12." FRCrimP 23(b).
15 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
16 The rule was adopted pursuant to FRCP 83, which is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2071
(1976), allowing local rules consistent with the federal rules and Supreme Court decisions.
17 The amendment states:
In Suits at common law, when the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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was consistent with FRCP 48.18
Because twelve is not a magic number,1 9 providing for more
than twelve would seem as constitutionally consistent 20 and proce-
durally acceptable as providing for less than twelve. Therefore, even
if a court determines that the substitution of alternate jurors during
deliberations produces ajury of greater than twelve members, no vio-
lation of FRCP 48 occurs.
FRCrimP 23(b), unlike FRCP 48, states that a jury shall consist
of twelve members, which number can be reduced only by stipula-
tion of the parties.2 I Although courts have interpreted the rule to
mean twelve is the maximum number of jurors allowable,22 such an
interpretation, like that of FRCP 48, is based on the mistaken belief
that in a criminal case the Constitution mandates a jury of twelve.
23
In Williams v. Florida,24 the Supreme Court declared that a twelve-
person jury is not constitutionally required in a criminal case. The
Court said Congress, by passing FRCrimP 23(b), determined the jury
size required in federal criminal cases. 25 Thus, the substitution of
alternate jurors during deliberations, whether they are present or ab-
sent during the prior deliberations, violates FRCrimP 23(b), if substi-
tution constitutes a jury of more than twelve members.26
18 413 U.S. at 163. But see 413 U.S. at 165 (Douglas & Powell, JJ., dissenting); Comment,
Constitutional Laz,--Th Sir ManJuy in Federal Court, 28 ARK. L. REv. 270, 279 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Comment, The Six ManJugy].
19 See 413 U.S. at 157; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970); 22 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 119, 124 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Williams o. Florida].
20 See State v. Cuzick, 85 Wash. 2d 146, 530 P.2d 288, 289 (1975) (Williams makes it
difficult to see how a jury of 13 would prejudice the respondent).
21 See note 14 supra.
22 See United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hayu-
tin, 398 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868,
870 (4th Cir. 1964).
23 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 102-03. For a proper waiver of constitutional
rights in a criminal case, not only does the defendant have to knowingly and intelligently
consent, but government counsel must consent and the court must sanction the procedure.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). Accord, Note, Rule 24(c), supra note 10, at
1610.
24 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
25 Id. at 102-03 n.50.
26 Note, Rule 24(c), supra note 10, at 1610. The House Judiciary Committee proposed an
amendment allowing verdicts by less than the original jury of twelve, where one or more
jurors were excused. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE




A. Substitution During Deliberations of Alternate Jurors Absent from
the Prior Deliberations
1. Right to Jury Trial--Sixth and Seventh Amendments
The first of four2 7 constitutional considerations is whether sub-
stitution during deliberations of an alternate absent from the prior
deliberations results in more jurors than is constitutionally allowed.
The Supreme Court, by refusing to establish a maximum number of
jurors that can constitutionally compose a jury,28 has rendered this
consideration obsolete in federal cases.
States that require a jury of twelve members have taken two
views. Some states contend that deliberations by more than twelve
jurors is the equivalent of a trial by more than twelve jurors.29 The
other states contend that, because only twelve jurors consider the is-
sues at one time, the right to a jury trial by twelve jurors remains
intact.30 The former states appear to believe that the discharged ju-
ror affected the verdict.31 But since determining the discharged ju-
ror's probable effect is pure speculation, 32 the focus should be on the
verdict's being reached after the deliberations and vote of twelve ju-
rors. Viewed in this light, twelve jurors, not thirteen, render the deci-
sion, and no constitutional violation occurs.
The second constitutional consideration concerns the quality of
the deliberations; whether an alternate juror's effectiveness in the
jury room is reduced or enhanced when a substitution during delib-
erations is made. The effectiveness of a substituted juror depends on
how much deliberation has already occurred, the jury's composition
and characteristics, and the dynamics of the deliberations.3 3 A ju-
27 For a listing and short discussion of these four factors, among others, see N.J. Supreme
Court Committee Report, supra note 6, at 15-16.
28 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (six-member jury is minimum); Colgrove,
413 U.S. at 157 (1973); Williamr, 399 U.S. at 102.
29 See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1980) (dissent); People
v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100, 104-05, 224 N.E.2d 710, 712-13, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199, 203 (1966);
Woods v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 312, 152 S.W.2d 997, 998-99 (1941).
30 See note 8 supra. See also United States v. Baccari, 489 F.2d 274, 275 (10th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 914 (1974).
31 This belief is implied in the courts' decisions. See note 29 supra.
32 See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1975) (dissent); N.J. Supreme
Court Committee Report, supra note 6, at 16. The case and article talk of the speculativeness of
determining the coercion on a substituted juror and a substituted juror's effect on the
deliberations.
33 See Kessler, The Social Pchologv ofJuy Deliberations, reprinted in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICAN 83 (R. Simon ed. 1975); G. STUCKEY, PROCEDURES IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 164-
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ror's ability to deliberate effectively is central to the jury trial right.
The right to a jury trial in the federal courts is guaranteed in
criminal and civil cases by the sixth 34 and seventh 35 amendments.
The Supreme Court in Williams and Colgrove established that in fed-
eral and state criminal and civil trials it is the substance of the com-
mon law right to trial by jury, and not the procedural details, which
is required by these amendments. 36 The purpose of the jury trial in
criminal cases is to prevent government oppression,3 7 "and, in crimi-
nal and civil cases, to assure a fair and equitable resolution of factual
issues."38 The Supreme Court in Williams set forth the jury's essen-
tial feature as "the interposition between the accused and his accuser
of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen . ... ,,3 The
jury makes such ajudgment if it consists "of a group of laymen repre-
sentative of a cross section of the community who have the duty and
opportunity to deliberate, free from outside attempts at intimidation
.... )540 The substitution of an alternate juror who was absent from
the prior deliberations would not affect significantly the exercise of
the group's commonsense judgment, so as to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
Missing the prior deliberations is a serious problem. 4 t The alter-
nate juror is likely to be lost and unsure of exactly what to do or say,
because he was not a part of the prior deliberations. Thus, without
first requiring the other jurors to explain their reasons for previously
65 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as G. STUCKEY]; N.J. Suprene Court Committee Report, supra
note 6, at 16.
34 The amendment reads in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law. .. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
35 See note 17 supra.
36 See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 156-57; Williams, 399 U.S. at 99-100, 102-03. See also Johnson
v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 124 (7th Cir. 1981).
37 399 U.S. at 87, 100. See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157.
38 413 U.S. at 157.
39 399 U.S. at 100. But see 26 J. CRIM. L. & C. 121, 122 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, People v. Brneman]. At common law, a jury trial had three requisities: the issues of
fact were decided by twelve jurors, the jurors were supposed to be impartial, and the decision
had to be unanimous. Id.
40 399 U.S. at 100. Accord, Commonwealth v. Haywood, Mass. Adv. Sh. 965 (Apr. 5,
1979).
41 Professor Wright bases his statement, that substitution during deliberations is revers-
ible error, primarily on the problem of the missed prior deliberations. WRIGHT, supra note 5,
at 52. Accord, People v. Ryan, 19 N.Y.2d 100, 104, 224 N.E.2d 710, 712, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199,
202-03 (1966). See also Comment, People v. Brneman, supra note 39, at 123 (expresses concern
over substitution and missed prior deliberations). Contra, 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
24.05 (2d ed. 1975).
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made decisions, the alternate juror will find it difficult to contribute
meaningfully to the remaining deliberations, and to vote
intelligently.
Some states have alleviated this problem by requiring a jury in-
struction ordering the deliberations to start anew in the event of a
substitution.42 It is unrealistic, however, to believe juries will start at
the very beginning. Nevertheless, the purpose and effect of the in-
struction is not diminished, because it tells the jury to thoroughly
brief the alternate juror as to what has been discussed and decided,
and the reasons for any decisions. With this information, the alter-
nate juror may intelligently attack currently held positions and may
make a fully informed decision when he votes.43 The alternate juror
is thus placed in substantially the same position as the other jurors.
44
Although the alternate juror misses the dynamics of the prior deliber-
ations,45 these dynamics are quickly rekindled if the alternate juror
sparks the prior discussion back to life with questions or objections.
The quality of the deliberations, and the ultimate verdict, de-
pend on a variety of factors. Jury studies have examined such factors
as sex, age, race, education, 46 occupation, socioeconomic status,47 na-
42 See People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687,693-94, 552 P.2d 742, 746-47, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782,
786-87 (1976), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 1077 (1977); Commonwealth v. Haywood, Mass. Adv. Sh.
at 965; State v. Trent, 79 N.J. 251, 256-57, 398 A.2d 1271, 1273-74 (1979). The court in
Collins pointed out the concern expressed by Professor Wright and the New York court in
Ryan with the missed prior deliberations, and how the instruction to begin anew remedies the
problem. 17 Cal. 3d at 694 n.4, 552 P.2d at 747 n.4, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 787 n.4. Collins
emphasized that part of the jury trial right is the requirement that each juror participates in
all deliberations. Id. at 694, 552 P.2d at 746, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 787. But see United States v.
Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 1128 (4th Cir. 1980) (possible consequences of missed prior delibera-
tions pure conjecture).
To further ensure the fairness and integrity of this procedure, the jurors could be asked
whether they could begin anew. See United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D. Fla.
1979). If one or more expressed doubts the trial judge, at his discretion, could prohibit the
substitution. See State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 407, 388 A.2d 218, 225 (1978) (situation might
arise where it is better not to substitute).
43 See United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. at 573; Tanner v. State, 242 Ga. 437, 438, 249
S.E.2d 238, 239-40 (1978); G. STUCKEY, supra note 33, at 164; N.J. Supreme Court Committee
Report, supra note 6, at 16.
44 See United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. at 573. In Barone, the court stated that if a
court instructs a jury to start deliberations from the beginning upon substitution of an alter-
nate juror, the defendant's fundamental right "to a unanimous verdict by a jury of twelve is
preserved inviolate." Id.
45 G. STUCKEY, supra note 33, at 165.
46 See generally, R. SIMON, THE JURY AND ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, THE INFLU-
ENCE OF DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS ON JUROR SELECTION AND PER-
FORMANCE 29-47 (1980) [hereinafter cited as R. SIMON]; R. Simon, THE JURY AND THE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY 111 (1967); Bullock, Signiftance of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison
Sentences, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 411 (1961); Castantini & King, The Partialjuror: Correlates
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tionality,4 knowledge about a specific case49 and previous juror ex-
perience50 as influencing a juror's deliberations and decision. 5 1
Similar studies have also shown such elements of the trial as the at-
torneys' competency,52 juror sympathy for a defendant, 53 the "body
language" of the trial participants, 54 the crime,55 unanimous versus
majority verdicts56 and the number of prosecution and defendant ar-
guments57 affect and are affected 58 by jury deliberations. 59
And Courses Of Prejudgment, 15 L. & Soc. REV. 9 (1980-81) [hereinafter cited as Castantini];
James-Simon, Status and Competence injuty Deliberations, 64 AM. J. Soc. 563 (1959); McGinnis
& Vaughn, Some Biographical Determiners of Participation in Group Dicussion, 41 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 1979 (1957); Mills & Bohannon,Juror Characteristics: To What Extent Are They Related to
jug, Verdicts? 64 JUD. 22, 31 (1980); Mitchell & Byrne, The Defense's Dilemma: Ects of furors'
Attitudes and Authoritarianism onjudicialDecisions, 25 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 123, 124-
25 (1973); Sealy & Cornish,jurors and Their Verdicts, 36 MOD. L. REv. 496 (1973); Stephan, Sex
Prejudice injugr Simulation, 88 J. PSYCH. 305, 306-08 (1974); Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins,
Social Status injuy Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 713 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Strodtbeck,
Social Status]; Strodtbeck & Mann, Sex Role Differentiation inug Deliberations, 19 SOCIOMETRY
3 (1956).
47 See R. Simon, supra note 46, at 38-39; Alder, Socioeconomic Factors In flencingjuo, Verdicts,
3 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 4 (1973); Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as
Afecting Juror Behavior. A Preliminary Look, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1079 (1965); Hermann, Occupa-
tions oflurors as an Inftuence on their Verdict, 5 FORUM 150 (1970); Strodtbeck, Social Status, supra
note 46, at 716.
48 See, e.g., R. Simon, supra note 46, at 39; Broeder, The University ofChicagoJug Project, 38
NEB. L. REV. 744, 748 (1959).
49 See Castantini, supra note 46, at 17-24.
50 See, e.g., Broeder, PreviousJuqy Trial Service as Afecting Juror Behavior, 1965 INS. UJ. 138.
51 See R. Simon, supra note 46: "The evidence as manifested by empirical studies shows
that there is some relationship between verdicts and the jurors' personal and social character-
istics; but the relationship is not strong." Id. at 41. Social status significantly affects juror
performance at the deliberation stage. Id. at 46.
52 See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 122 (1949); Cramer, A View fom theJuy Box, 6
LITIGATION 3 (1979). See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 351-74 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as H. KALVEN].
53 See Landry & Aronson, The Influence ofthe Character of the Criminal and His Victim on the
Decisions ofSimulatedJurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 141 (1969). See also H. KALVEN,
supra note 52, at 193-220.
54 See, e.g., Vidmar, E fects ofDecision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions fSimu-
lated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 211 (1972). E.g., Alder, Socioeconomic Factors
In flencingfuy Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANCE 1-4 (1973); Kessler, supra note 33,
at 84. "Body Language" refers to, inter alia, gestures, the manner in which things are said,
and dress of the participants in a trial.
55 See H. KALVEN, supra note 52, at 301-05; R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF
INSANITY 106 (1967); Castantini, supra note 46, at 24-27.
56 See, e.g., M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 20-27, 91-99 (1977) [hereinafter cited as M. SAKS].
This study has been noted for the quality and methodology of the research, and for its being
thus far uncontested. R. SIMON, supra note 46, at 75-76.
57 See Calder, Insko, & Yardell, The Relation ofCognitive and Memorial Processes to Persuasion
in a SimulatedJug Trial, 4 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 62 (1974).
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The dynamics of group deliberations are also an important con-
sideration. Deliberations in smaller juries differ from those in larger
juries,60 although no significant differences in verdicts have been
found.6' Furthermore, the verdict in most cases reflects the majority
vote on the first ballot.6 2 The initial majority will listen to a dissenter
voice his views and attempt to change the dissenter's mind.63 A dis-
senter might not voice his objections, particularly in a larger group,
64
although the presence of an ally encourages most dissenters to voice
their convictions. 65  Unless the dissenting juror has' an ally,66 the
chances of which are greater in larger juries,67 the dissenting juror
58 See Sonaike, The Influence ofjJuq Deliberation on juror Perception of Tial, Credibility, and
Damage Awards, 1978 B.Y.U. L. REv. 889, 905-07.
59 See 2 PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE TRIAL PROCESS 209-34 (B.
Sales ed. 1981) ("equity theory" - the just distribution of outcomes in a social exchange rela-
tionship, and the response tendencies of individual jurors) [hereinafter cited as THE TRIAL
PROCESS].
60 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232 (1978); J. Davis, R. Bray & R. Holt, The
Empirical Study ofDecision injuries: A Critical Review, reprinted in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDI-
VIDUAL IN SOCIE-rY-PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 346 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds.
1977) [hereinafter cited as J. Davis]; M. SAKS, supra note 56, at 11, 70-103; Kessler, supra note
33, at 83-84; A.M. & J.C. Rosenblatt, Six Memberjuries in Criminal Cases: Legal and Psychological
Considerations, 46 N.Y. ST. B.J. 263-64 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rosenblatt]. See also A.
HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 231 (1962).
61 See M. SAKS, supra note 56, at 105; R. Simon, supra note 46, at 75. But see Rosenblatt,
supra note 60, at 263 (largerjury more likely to reach correct decision); Note, StalisticalAnalysis
andjug Size: Ballew v. State of Georgia, 56 DENVER L.J. 659, 671 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Statistical Analysis].
62 See H. KALVEN, supra note 52, at 488 (90% of the time); R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY 227 (1967) (91% of the time). See also Lempert, Uncovering 'Wondis-
cerible" Dife9rences: Empirical Research and theJu,-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 645, 651 n.32
(1975), citing C. Hawkins, Interaction and Coalition Realignment in Consensus-Seeking Groups.- A Study
ofExprerimentaljuy Deliberations (Aug. 17, 1960) (unpublished doctoral dissertation in Univer-
sity of Chicago Library) [hereinafter cited as Lempert].
63 See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 33, at 84; Lempert, supra note 62, at 694; Rosenblatt, supra
note 60, at 264.
64 See Kessler, supra note 33, at 83-84. Cf. Lempert, supra note 62, at 694 (citing Hawkins).
65 See S. Asch, Efects of Group Pressure Upon the Modiftation and Distortion of.Judgements,
reprinted in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 180 (3d ed. E. Maceoby, T. Newcomb & E.
Hartley eds. 1958); Kessler, supra note 33, at 84.
66 See, e.g., M. SAKS; supra note 56, at 18; Lempert, supra note 62, at 673; Rosenblatt,
supra note 60, at 264; Thomas & Fink, E ffcts of Group Size, 60 PSYCH. BULL 371 (1963). See
also Note, Statistical Analysis, supra note 61, at 667. But see Asch, supra note 65, at 177, 183
(some individuals did not succumb to majority pressure, even though there were no allies).
67 See, e.g., M. SAKS, sura note 56, at 18; Kessler, supra note 33, at 84; Lempert, supra note
62, at 673; Note, StatisticalAnaoysis, supra note 61, at 670. Empirical data shows twelve-person
juries hang 5.5% of the time, while six-person juries hang 2.4% of the time, supporting the
propositions that allies are needed to resist majority pressure and allies are more likely to be
found in larger groups. Zeisel, . . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal
juy, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 719-20 (1971).
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
usually goes against his better judgment and succumbs to the major-
ity.68 A hung jury, on the other hand, results when the dissent has
successfully resisted majority pressure.
69
The studies reveal, and commonsense dictates, that the nature
and extent of the effect of an alternate juror's substitution is pure
speculation. 70 Although some changes in result are inevitable,7I they
would seem rare. 72 A change may also not be for the worst; perhaps
a jury would thus avoid an incorrect result. A change in procedure
to allow the substitution during deliberations of an alternate juror
who was absent from the prior deliberations would not inure to the
advantage or detriment of either the defendant, the plaintiff, or the
state. 73
In its jury decisions, the Supreme Court has also admitted
changes in result would occur, as changes would occur if substitution
during deliberations was allowed, but the Court dismissed the
changes as insignificant. 74 In Williams v. Floi'da, the Court, in con-
cluding that juries of less than twelve members are constitutional,
opined that reducing a jury to six members could lead to fewer hung
juries, but dismissed this fact as a nondiscernible difference. 75 The
Court, however, relied on an unsupportable factual foundation in
reaching this conclusion. 76 Research has shown that a reduction to
68 See Note, On Instructing DeadlockedJuries, 78 YALE LJ. 100 (1968). See also R. SIMON,
supra note 46, at 64; Lempert, supra note 62, at 673 n.90.
69 H. KALVEN, supra note 52, at 462. Kalven and Zeisel also state that hung juries will
occur more often where four or five jurors dissent at the beginning of the deliberations. Id. at
463. See M. SAKS, supra note 56, at 3.
70 See R. SIMON, supra note 46, at 45-46. See also NJ. Supreme Court Committee Report, supra
note 6, at 16.
71 For example, an alternate juror, who has made up his mind and will not be persuaded
otherwise, may be substituted for a juror who, along with all the other jurors, has decided
differently, resulting in a mistrial. This result, however, is good if the alternate juror was
correct in his judgment.
72 See notes 46-69 supra and accompanying text (indicates that changes in procedure
would not produce many changes in result).
73 See Lempert, supra note 62, at 677-78 n.100.
74 See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 101 n.48 (1970). See also Colgrove v. Battin, 413
U.S. 149, 159 n.15 (1973) (convincing empirical evidence of the correctness of Williams).
However, as Lempert stated: "The Supreme Court ignored the matter of the hung jury in
Colgrove and assumed away any difficulties in Williams." Lempert, supra note 62, at 678.
75 399 U.S. at 101 n.48.
76 For some discussion of the problems with the studies relied upon by the Supreme
Court in Williams and Colgrove, see M. SAKS, supra note 56, at 9-11, 37-59; R. SIMON, supra
note 46, at 74-75; Zeisel & Diamond, Convincing Empirical Evidence On Six MemberJuty, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 281 (1974). For a thorough discussion of the use of applied social research by
the courts, see THE USE * NONUSE 0 MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE
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six members causes a significant reduction in minority views,77 and
that the presence of an ally is almost essential for a dissenter to hold
out. 78 This suggests that the reduction in hung juries would be more
substantial than the Court anticipated. 79 In addition, studies have
disproved the conclusion in Williams that jurors in the dissent are
influenced by the proportionate size of the majority against them.80
A decrease in jury size from twelve to six members also significantly
reduces the representation of the community.8 1 Finally, research
generally does not support the Court's point in Co/grove v. Batlin
82
that smaller juries deliberate better.8 3 Nevertheless, such studies
have not convinced the Court that the change occurring in the six-
member jury's exercise of its commonsense judgment is significant
enough to rise to constitutional dimensions.
84
In Apodaca v. Oregeon,85 the Court sustained a state law allowing
nonunanimous jury verdicts in noncapital criminal cases. Four jus-
tices noted that a unanimous verdict requirement results in hung ju-
ries in situtations where nonunanimous juries convict or acquit. Yet,
no constitutional infirmity was found.
8 6
The Court in W/illias, Colgrove, and Apodaca viewed the jury's
basic function as having been effectively carried out. The interposi-
tion of the jury between the accused and the state, and the jury's
subsequent judgment, was not considered significantly altered when
a six-member or nonunanimous jury was involved. Similarly, substi-
COURTS (M. Saks & C. Baron ed. 1980); Singley, Ballew v. Georgia: Five Is Not Enough for
What? 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 217, 256 n.272 (1979).
77 Zeisel, supra note 67, at 715. See M. SAKS, supra note 56, at 18-19, 90-91; R. SIMON,
supra note 46, at 75-76; Lempert, supra note 62, at 668-79; Zeisel, Twelve IsJust, 10 TRIAL 13
(1974) (72/100 twelve-person juries will contain a minority; 47/100 six-person juries will con-
tain a minority); Note, StatisticalAnalysis, supra note 61, at 656; Note, The Jugy Size Question in
Penmylvania.' Six Of One andA Dozen Of The Other, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 89, 90 n.6 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NoteJug, Size].
78 See notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra.
79 See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 62, at 676-70; Note, Statistical Anajsis, supra note 61, at
668; Zeisel, supra note 67, at 719-20. But see M. SAKS, supra note 56, at 89-90 (results of
experiment inconclusive because sample not large enough).
80 Zeisel, sura note 67, at 719-20. See also M. SAKS, supra note 56, at 17-18 (logarithmic
function).
81 See note 73 supra.
82 413 U.S. at 159 n.15.
83 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232 (1978); M. SAKS, supra note 56, at 12, 105;
Lempert, supra note 62, at 693-95; NoteJury Size, supra note 77, at 90 n.5; Rosenblatt, supra
note 60, at 263.
84 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. at 240-41.
85 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (4-4-1 decision).
86 Id. at 411 (these four judges followed the Williams analysis).
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tuting alternate jurors during deliberations is no more detrimental to
a criminal defendant or a civil party than is a jury's reduction from
twelve to six members8 7 or allowing nonunanimous verdicts. 8  Fi-
nally, while the parties in a jury trial are not entitled to a particular
verdict, they are entitled to a jury's fair and thorough consideration
of the issues, which is attained through jury deliberations.8 9 The sub-
stitution during deliberations of an alternate juror who is absent
from the prior deliberations does not affect significantly the jury
deliberations.
A third constitutional consideration, whether alternate jurors
are more susceptible to improper influence than the other jurors, is a
legitimate concern that a court can negate through the use of proper
procedures. A court sequestering the deliberating jurors should also
separately sequester the alternate jurors.9° Courts that dismiss alter-
nate jurors, but tell them to "stand-by," should instruct them that
they are still under their jurors' oath and cannot discuss the case with
anyone. 91 In any event, a court should conduct a careful voir dire of
the alternate jurors, as they are needed, to determine (1) if there has
been any improper influence, and (2) if the alternate juror can
render a fair decision.
92
The fourth and final constitutional concern, whether jurors will
feign an illness or otherwise become disqualified to avoid a difficult
decision, 93 is a very speculative one9 that a judge can take steps to
87 See notes 76-84 and accompanying text supra.
88 45% fewer hung juries occur in jurisdictions allowing majority verdicts. H. KALVEN,
supra note 52, at 461. The Ninth Circuit has also noted the importance of minority view
consideration and how unanimity ensures such consideration. United States v. Lopez, 581
F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1978). A unanimous verdict impinges more on the jury trial right
than substitution during deliberations. Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 178 (7th Cir. 1980).
89 "No group, in short, has the right to block convictions; it has only the right to partici-
pate in the overall legal processes by which criminal guilt and innocence are determined."
Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 413.
90 See Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1981) (when jurors are seques-
tered, so are the alternate jurors); United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D. Fla.
1979) (alternate juror sequestered separately from "regular" jurors).
91 See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1975) (court did not hold
juror to jurors' obligation).
92 See Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d at 179 (alternate juror examined to determine if he
could make a fair decision before substitution was allowed); United States v. Barone, 83
F.R.D. at 571 (alternate juror questioned before substitution to determine if he had been
prejudiced and if he had adhered to his jurors' obligation).
93 See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1156; United States v. Virginia Erection Corp.,
335 F.2d 868, 871 (4th Cir. 1964). Ste also WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 53 n.17.




minimize. As part of his jury instructions, a judge should emphasize
each juror's responsibility as a juror.95 A judge could also threaten to
hold any juror found faking an illness in contempt of court. A con-
tempt threat may not be necessary, however, since it is unlikely that
an instruction prohibiting a feigned illness will be disobeyed.
96
When a juror does ask to be discharged because of illness, the judge
should conduct a careful voir dire to determine if the juror is fak-
ing,97 including an examination by a qualified physician.98 The
judge could also describe the voir dire procedure when he reads the
jury instructions. When a court discharges a juror because of illness,
the court risks the implication that the discharged juror was a lone
dissenter whose place will be taken by a more pliable alternate ju-
ror.99 Although such a view is highly speculative, a court should take
the preceding precautions to avoid such an implication. Any effect,
whether the precautions are taken or not, is constitutionally
insignificant. 00
Although the substitution of an alternate juror who was absent
from the prior deliberations will have an effect, it is too insignificant
to deprive a party of the jury deliberations necessary for the jury to
reach the requisite commonsense community judgment. Since this is
the constitutional standard established by Williams and its progeny,
the substitution during deliberations of an alternate juror who was
absent during the prior deliberations is therefore not of constitutional
dimension.
2. Due Process-Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
The sixth amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases ap-
95 Cf. United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. at 571 (court inquired into whether substituted
juror had adhered to his jurors' obligation).
96 See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1160 (dissent); People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d
687, 694, 552 P.2d 742, 747, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787 (1976); State v. Cuzick, 85 Wash. 2d 146,
530 P.2d 288, 289 (1975).
97 See People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d at 696, 552 P.2d at 748, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 788 (com-
prehensive, exacting hearing conducted by trial judge).
98 S , e.g., United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d at 1155 (court discharged juror due to death
ofco-worker); United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1973) (court questioned
the discharged juror); United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. at 566-67 (doctor examined and the
court discharged the juror pursuant to the doctor's recommendation). See a/so Henderson v.
Lane, 613 F.2d at 176; United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442, 443 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
Both of these cases dealt with jurors who suffered heart attacks. No voir dire or examination
by a physician is required under these or similar circumstances.
99 See notes 66-68 and accompanying text .rupa.
100 See Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d at 178 (nonunanimous verdict requirement impinges
more on "mistrial right" of the defendant).
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plies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.°10 It is unclear
to what extent the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applies to
the states.10 2 If wholly applicable, the right as applied through the
fourteenth amendment would not be impaired, because the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial is not affected significantly by substi-
tution during deliberations. 0 3 If the sixth amendment is not wholly
applicable to the states, a court must determine if substitution during
deliberations of an alternate juror who was absent from the prior
deliberations results in a fourteenth amendment due process viola-
tion. Required is an examination of (1) "[w]hether [substitution] in-
hibits the functioning of the jury as an institution to a significant
degree and [(2)], if so, whether any state interest justifies the disrup-
tion so as to preserve its constitutionality."1
0 4
Although substitution during deliberations does not significantly
inhibit the functioning of the jury, 0 5 even if it did an important state
interest justifies and outweighs any disruption. Judicial economy,10 6
the reason for substitution during deliberations, was deemed a sub-
101 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 124
(7th Cir. 1981).
102 See Apoaca, 406 U.S. at 366 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring and finding it is not). It
appears that the four "majority" justices were reading Duncan in this manner. The three
dissenting justices stated it is wholly applicable.
103 See notes 27-100 and accompanying text supra.
104 Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231 (1978). This same test would apply if substitu-
tion during deliberations in civil and criminal trials were attacked in federal courts based on a
fifth amendment due process argument. See, e.g., Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310 (1903). Dif-
ferent constructions and applications are appropriate in certain cases. See, e.g., French v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324 (1901). But here, since the assumption is that the
sixth amendment is wholly applicable to the states, the same application would be appropri-
ate. See United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975) (fifth amendment due
process violation contention not reached).
State civil trials present a separate concern because the seventh amendment has not been
held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Fay v. New York,
322 U.S. 261, 288 (1947). Because civil disputes often involve property interests, procedural
due process is required. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976). A state may regulate its courts' procedures, unless the proce-
dures are contrary to fundamental liberty or fundamental justice. See, e.g., Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). The seventh amendment right to a jury trial has not been de-
clared fundamental. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. at 441; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333-
35. Therefore, a state adopting the substitution during deliberations procedure would not
violate procedural due process.
105 See notes 27-100 and accompanying text supra.
106 See Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1944), af'd, 324 U.S. 282
(1945); People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 692, 552 P.2d 742, 745, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 785
(1976); Tanner v. State, 242 Ga. 437, 438, 249 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1978); Commonwealth v.
Haywood, Mass. Adv. Sh. 965 (Apr. 5, 1979).
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stantial state interest by the Supreme Court in Burch v. Louisiana.10 7
The Court in Burch, however, did not find the state interest in judi-
cial economy sufficient to overcome the constitutional disruption in
allowing a nonunanimous verdict by a six-man jury in a criminal
trial. The Court, however, noted that the state interest in Burch was
merely speculative,108 whereas the benefits of substitution during de-
liberations are far from speculative. No statistics are available to
show the frequency of mistrials due to juror incapacity or disqualifi-
cation during deliberations, but the problem has arisen enough that
commentators and draftors have asked for relief,10 9 and some states
have provided relief.110
Because alternate jurors are normally used in trials of significant
duration,"' a mistrial causes the waste of much time and money. A
second trial also displaces other trials, further adding to the cost, de-
lay, and congestion currently plaguing United States' courts. " 2 The
cost to the judicial system is the combination of these explicit and
implicit"13 costs.
Not all mistrials are unnecessary, however, for they are an im-
portant tool in protecting litigants' rights.' 4 But mistrials occurring
when a deliberating juror becomes incapacitated or disqualified are
unnecessary and their substantial judicial costs can be avoided if
courts permit alternate juror substitution during deliberations. The
107 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979).
108 Id.
109 See note 7 supra.
110 See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
111 See notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text sup ra.
112 See, e.g., F. KLEIN, FEDERAL AND STATE COURT SYSTEMS-A GUIDE 46-48 (1977);
Burger, Report on the FederalJudicial Branch - 1973, 59 A.B.AJ. 1125, 1127-28 (1973); Clark, A
Commentary on Congestion in the Federal Courts, 8 ST. MARY'S L. REv. 407 (1976); Corby, supra
note 1, at 70; High Cost of Litigation, 86 F.R.D. 267 (1980); Hufstedler & Nejelski, A.B.A. Action
Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A.J. 965 (1980); Hawkins, supra note 1,
at 19; Burger's Flagstaff Address, supra note 1, at 449-58; Kirkham, supra note 1, at 498-532;
Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View from the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245, 246-50 (1976); Shear, Court
Costs, Delay and Facilities, 54 FLA. B.J. 321, 322 (1980).
Lasker states that the cost of delay goes beyond the denial of rights and also includes the
effect on the judges, who "sense keenly the lack of time to reflect, the perils of hasty decision."
Lasker, The Court Crnch, sura, at 250.
113 The implicit cost to the courts of the lost trial time is similar to the cost in economics of
"missed opportunities or foregone alternatives." An example is that steel "used for arma-
ments is not available for the manufacture of cars." C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS 497 (6th
ed. 1975). Likewise, the court time used for retrials is court time unavailable for new trials.
114 See Note, Mistrial and Double Jeopardy, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 939-41 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Mistrial].
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state interest is sufficient to justify the assumed minimal disruption in
the jury's functioning.
3. Double Jeopardy-Federal and State
The third constitutional argument made against the substitu-
tion during deliberations of an alternate juror absent from the prior
deliberations is that such substitution results in a trial by two twelve-
member juries. ' 15 In federal and state criminal trials, such a result
violates the fifth ' 16 and fourteenth 1 7 amendment guarantees against
placing a defendant in double jeopardy.
There are not two juries of twelve jurors, however, but one jury
of regulars and alternates. A substitution during deliberations, like a
pre-deliberations substitution, is not the start of a second trial, but a
continuation of the first.t"8 A substitution furthers the defendant's
right to have his trial completed by the particular tribunal that be-
gan it.' 19 More specifically, the trial is completed by the jury that
the defendant's counsel helped select. A substitution also avoids the
needless anxiety, expense, ordeal and embarrassment of starting over
if the court declares a mistrial. 20 Thus, alternate juror substitution
during deliberations does not place the defendant in double
jeopardy. 121
Alternatively, the doctrine of manifest necessity also defeats a
115 See N.J. Supreme Court Committee Report, supra note 6, at 16.
116 The pertinent part of the amendment reads: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
117 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793-96 (1969) (fifth amendment double jeopardy
clause applicable to the states).
118 See Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d 313, appeal dimssed, 385 U.S. 802 (9th Cir. 1966);
People v. Green, 15 Cal. App. 3d 524, 528-29, 93 Cal. Rptr. 84, 86 (1971); People v. Hohen-
see, 251 Cal. App. 2d 193, 203-04, 59 Cal. Rptr. 234, 241 (1967).
119 See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
120 The general policy behind the double jeopardy clause is to avoid just these things. In
a famous quote Justice Black stated:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system ofjurisprudence, is that the state with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged of-
fense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel-
ling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). See also Findlater, Retrial After a Hung
Jug.- The Double Jeopardy Problem, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 701, 713-14 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Findlater].
121 See Leser v. United States, 390 F.2d 634, 635 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 953
(1968); Leser v. United States, 358 F.2d at 318; People v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 696-97, 552




double jeopardy claim. The doctrine states that after jeopardy has
attached a court can discontinue the trial and reprosecute the de-
fendant if the court determines that "the defendant's interest in pro-
ceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and equally
legitimate demand for public justice."1
22
Where incapacitation or disqualification occurs during delibera-
tions, one of three things is possible: (1) the parties will stipulate to a
verdict by fewer than twelve jurors; (2) the court will grant a mis-
trial; or (3) the court will permit substitution. Stipulation is the pre-
ferred, but rarely chosen, 23 alternative, because any possible
constitutional objections are then waived by the defendant. 24 A
mistrial, on the other hand, results when the jury contains fewer
members than are required by statute or the Constitution. Because
mistrials involve aborting one trial and beginning another, they are
directly contrary to "the defendant's interest in proceeding to ver-
dict."1 25 But since the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial
is at stake, manifest necessity requires a mistrial.' 26 Substitution, al-
ternatively, results in the continuation of the present trial and pro-
motes, rather than inhibits, the defendant's interest in proceeding to
verdict.' 27 Like the stipulation procedure, substitution also reduces
the emotional and financial burdens of multiple trials for the defend-
ants and the courts. It also avoids the risk that a second jury might
convict the defendant where the first jury would acquit.128 Manifest
122 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973). See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat) 579, 580 (1824); C. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 392-93
(1978).
123 A mistrial is considered better, because the prosecutor may drop the case, the defend-
ant will know the prosecutor's case, and, in the civil context, the plaintiff may have to forego
suing because of limited financial resources. See United States v. Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442,
443 (S.D. Fla. 1980); G. STUCKEY, supra note 33; Lempert, supra note 62, at 676-78. Cf. Note,
Statstical Analysis, supra note 61, at 668 n.55 (same results with a hung jury).
124 This assumes the Patton requirements are met. See note 23 supra. See also United States
v. Baccari, 489 F.2d 274, 275 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 914 (1974); Leser v. United
States, 358 F.2d at 317-18. But see Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Patton waiver is unnecessary if there is no constitutional deprivation). See also Note, Rule
24(c),supra note 10, at 1613.
125 Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. at 471.
126 See United States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 584 (1941);
Findlater, supra note 120, at 719-20; Note, Mistrial, supra note 114, at 939-41. See also People
v. Collins, 17 Cal. 3d at 696-97, 552 P.2d at 748, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
127 - Some authorities believe that substitution limits a defendant's "right" to a mistrial.
United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975); WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 53 n.17.
However, as pointed out in Henderson, a nonunanimous verdict requirement impinges more on
the "mistrial right." 613 F.2d at 178.
128 See note 120 supra. See also M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 41 n.2 (1969); Note,
The Aftermath of North Carolina v. Pearce: A Harsher Sentence on Retrial, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv..
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necessity and the public demand for justice prefer substitution dur-
ing deliberations to a mistrial.
1 29
B. Presence and Subsequent Substitution of Alternate Jurors During
Deliberations
The substitution during deliberations of alternate jurors present
during the prior deliberations involves many of the same constitu-
tional considerations, analysis, and conclusions as for the substitution
during deliberations of alternate jurors absent from the prior deliber-
ations. One important distinction, of three made, however, is that
alternate jurors present in the jury room during deliberations do not
miss the prior deliberations. That is essential to the alternate juror's
contributing meaningfully to the deliberations and voting
knowledgeably. 13
0
A second alleged distinction made between alternate jurors ab-
sent and those present during deliberations is that an alternate juror
present during deliberations results in a jury of thirteen jurors.131
This is of no constitutional consequence in federal courts, because the
sixth and seventh amendments do not require twelve-member ju-
ries.13 2 The thirteen-member jury accusation is also not a realistic
one. Alternate jurors do not contribute anything to the deliberations
108 (1972); 25 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 60 (1968). Compare this to the choice by defendants of
a mistrial or hung jury over a continuation of the original trial. See note 123 and accompany-
ing text supra.
129 In Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 324, 332-33, 206 S.E.2d 481, 486 (1974), the Georgia
Supreme Court stated that a less stringent examination of alternatives to mistrial would be
undertaken where neither the state nor the defendant is at fault, and that parties in a civil or
criminal action are not responsible when a substitution is necessary. In accord with theJones
rationale, a less stringent examination of the substitution alternative to a mistrial is advo-
cated. The substitution alternative easily survives such scrutiny and is superior to a mistrial.
See Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 126 (7th Cir. 1981) (substitution of alternate juror
who was present during deliberations is the alternative most "faithful to the jury-trial guaran-
tee"). See also United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 1128 (4th Cir. 1980) (defendant's prefer-
ring substitution dissipates manifest necessity for mistrial).
130 See notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra. See also Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d
at 126 (alternate juror's presence during deliberations beneficial if substitution becomes
necessary).
131 United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d at 1130 (dissent); United States v. Chatman, 584
F.2d 1358, 1361 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d 868, 870
(4th Cir. 1964); People v. Adame, 36 Cal. App. 3d 402, 406-08, 111 Cal. Rptr. 462, 464-65
(1973); Woods v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 312, 152 S.W.2d 997, 999 (1941); State v. Bindyke,
288 N.C. 608, 220 S.E.2d 521, 533 (1975); Brigman v. Oklahoma, 350 P.2d 321, 322 (Old. Cr.
App. 1960); State v. Cuzick, 85 Wash. 2d 146, 530 P.2d 288, 289 (1975).
132 See notes 17-20, 24-25 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
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or verdict.'3 3 The effect of their presence on the deliberations and
verdict is like that of an "unused book."134 It is of no effect.'
3 5
The last alleged distinction made between absent and present
alternate jurors is that allowing alternate jurors in the jury room dur-
ing deliberations violates the "cardinal principle" of secret and pri-
vate jury deliberations.13 6 This contention has kept all the states but
Indiana from permitting alternate jurors to attend deliberations. In-
diana courts resolve any problems by admonishing alternate jurors
not to participate in any way during the deliberations, unless they
are substituted for a deliberating juror.137 The other courts' response
has been to emphasize that the alternate jurors' very presence in the
jury room may inhibit certain jurors from participating freely in the
deliberations, and that even a silent alternate juror's physical reac-
tions to jury comments and decisions could affect the delibera-
tions.' 38  The Supreme Court in Williams stated that group
deliberations and freedom from outside intimidation during deliber-
ations are part of the jury trial right. "9 The inquiry then is "whether
the presence of the alternate juror is the sort of invasion of the jury's
privacy that will tend to stifle the jury's debate, thus endangering the
133 This assumes the alternate jurors do not participate in the deliberations or vote of the
deliberating jurors.
134 United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1973). The court in Allison also
specifically stated that the presence during deliberations of an alternate juror did not result in
a verdict by greater than twelve jurors. Id. at 470.
135 Set Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948
(1978); 24 CAL. L. REv. 735, 737 (1936) (no violation before submission, no violation after
submission) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Alternate Jurors].
136 -United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d at 1361; United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153,
1160 (9th Cir. 1975) (dissent); United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d 468, 470 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d at 872; People v. Adame, 36 Cal. App. 3d
at 407-08, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 465; State Highway Comm'n v. Dunks, 166 Mont. 239, 531 P.2d
1316, 1318 (1975); State v. Bindyke, 220 S.E.2d at 533, 534-35; Brigman v. Oklahoma, 350
P.2d at 322; State v. Cuzick, 530 P.2d at 289. See also United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565,
573 (S.D. Fla. 1979); WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 52 (reversible error to allow alternate juror in
jury room during deliberations). Some courts hold an alternate juror's momentary and inad-
vertent presence in the jury room is harmless. See notes 195 & 202 and accompanying text
infra.
137 See notes 195 & 202 and accompanying text infia.
138 See United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d at 1361; United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d at
1156; United States v. Allison, 481 F.2d at 472; United States v. Beasley, 464 F.2d at 470-71;
United States v. Virginia Erection Corp., 335 F.2d at 872; People v. Adame, 36 Cal. App. 3d
at 407, 408 n.5, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 465 n.5; State Highway Comm'n v. Dunks, 531 P.2d at
1317; State v. Bindyke, 220 S.E.2d at 533; Brigman v. Oklahoma, 350 P.2d at 322; Patten v.
State, 221 Tenn. 337, 426 S.W.2d 503, 506 (1968); State v. Cuzick, 530 P.2d at 290.
139 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
defendant's right to trial by jury.''140
Jurisdictions not allowing alternate jurors to attend delibera-
tions have held explicitly and implicitly that alternate jurors are
strangers to the jury, because of their status as alternate jurors.'
41
The alternate juror is, however, a non-participating "regular juror,"
as FRCrimP 24(c) and FRCP 47(b) illustrate by stating in part:
Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the
same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and
challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same func-
tions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors. 142
The parties select the alternate jurors along with the other jurors,
who then sit as one body throughout the trial.1 43 If a court dis-
charges a juror, the alternate juror replaces him and functions as any
other member of the jury; "an alternate is in every respect a juror."'144
Furthermore, the regular jurors will view the alternate jurors as ordi-
nary jury members, because of the similarity in treatment and func-
tion. A juror who is inhibited by an alternate juror's presence will
most likely be inhibited by the other jurors as well. The presence of
the alternate jurors in the jury room should therefore be no different
than the presence of each other. 145 Thus, permitting alternate jurors
in the jury room would not adversely affect jury secrecy and pri-
vacy. 46 As an added precaution, a court could conduct a voir dire to
determine if the alternate jurors' presence in the jury room would
inhibit any of the regular jurors. 147 If any juror would be inhibited,
140 Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1981). See also notes 36-40 and
accompanying text sutra.
141 See note 138 supra.
142 See notes 3 & 4 supra.
143 Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d at 125.
144 Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. 256, 259-60, 369 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1977). But see United
States v. Allison, 481 F.2d at 470.
145 See notes 134-35 supra; Comment, Alternate Jurors, supra note 135, at 738. See aso Ruffin
v. State, 50 Del. 83, 123 A.2d 461, 466 (1956) (alternate jurors and regular jurors similar);
Tanner v. State, 242 Ga. 437, 438, 249 S.E.2d 238, 240 (1978); Comment, Bruneman v. State,
supra note 39, at 738 (no reason to believe presence of alternate jurors would restrict honest
comment).
The Seventh Circuit inJohnson v. Duckworth stated: "Other 'strangers' to the regular jury
stand in sharp contrast to the alternate." 650 F.2d at 125. The court further stated: "We do
not agree that alternate jurors pose the inherent risk of influencing the jury's judgment, or
inhibiting its debate, that is possessed by the presence of other strangers." Id. at 126.
146 See Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d at 126. Alternate jurors are not strangers or out-
siders to the jury. See Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175, 178-79 (7th Cir. 1980); Potter v.
Perine, 545 F.2d 1048, 1049-50 (6th Cir. 1976); People v. Valles, 24 Cal. 3d 121, 124-27, 593
P.2d 240, 242-43, 154 Cal. Rptr. 543, 544-47 (1979) (implied in holding).
147 See United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
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substitution would not be allowed.148
Alternate juror participation in the deliberations prior to substi-
tution is another concern of adversaries to this procedure's imple-
mentation. 49  Courts should instruct alternate jurors not to
participate, unless they replace a deliberating juror. 50 Assuming
that the alternate jurors will not participate, 151 courts could also take
steps to minimize or avoid the effect of an alternate juror showing a
positive or negative reaction through his facial expressions or other-
wise.' 52 The court could keep an alternate juror and his reactions
hidden from the deliberating jurors' view by setting up some kind of
a partition, or placing him in another room to listen to the delibera-
tions via an intercom system.153 The court would be responsible for
preventing abuses. Although the alternate jurors' ability to effec-
tively gauge the deliberations would be less than if partitions or an
intercom system were not used, having them is preferrable to no ex-
posure to the deliberations. However, regardless of whether these
precautions are taken, the familiarity of the jurors with the alternate
jurors prevents any effect on the deliberations from rising to the level
of a constitutional violation.'
54
III. Present State of the Law
A. Federal Courts
Seven United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have considered
alternate juror substitution during deliberations, generally in crimi-
nal appeals. In United States v. Allison, 55 the Fifth Circuit held that a
stipulation of the parties allowing an alternate juror to be present
148 See State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 407, 388 A.2d 218, 225 (1978).
149 See note 138 and accompanying text supra. See aZo Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d at
122-26 (this problem not addressed by the Seventh Circuit when they determined substitution
in a state trial of an alternate juror present during the deliberations was constitutional).
150 See notes 191-92 and accompanying text infra.
151 It is reasonable to assume the alternate jurors will follow the judge's instructions. See
note 96 and accompanying text supr-a.
152 See note 138 supra.
153 Placing a partition between the jurors or putting the alternate jurors in another room
acknowledges a difference exists between the alternate jurors and the deliberating jurors. A
difference does exist, but the alternate jurors are still jurors. The distinction is not between
jurors and outsiders, but between two different types of jurors.
154 No constitutional violation occurs, because the minute effect, if any, on the delibera-
tions would not stifle deliberation. Thus the jury trial right is preserved. See note 145 and
accompanying text sup-a (presence of alternate juror during deliberations does not affect the
deliberating jurors). See also Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d at 126 (presence of alternate
jurors would not inhibit debate).
155 481 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1973).
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during deliberations was not plain error requiring reversal. Not only
did the court carefully instruct the alternate juror not to participate,
but the state also failed to prove that the alternate juror participated
in the deliberations, took part in any jury votes, or by his presence
restrained any of the deliberating jurors from exercising indepen-
dence of thought and action. The court remanded the case to the
district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine if such
prejudice occurred.156 The Fifth Circuit also held in a civil case that
no prejudice resulted when an alternate juror, who attended deliber-
ations with the consent of counsel and was instructed by the court
not to participate, spoke during the deliberations.t 57 Finally, a dis-
trict court in the Fifth Circuit allowed a substitute juror during de-
liberations following a seven-month criminal trial. The alternate
juror had not been formally discharged and had had no outside con-
tact or contact with the deliberating jurors. 58
The Seventh Circuit, in Johnson v. Duckworth -59 and Henderson v.
Lane, 16° has taken the most liberal position about the substitution of
alternate jurors during deliberations. In Johnson, the court held that
the presence and subsequent substitution of an alternate juror during
deliberations in a state criminal trial did not violate the defendant's
sixth and fourteenth amendment rights.' 6 ' Similarly, in Henderson,
the court held that a state criminal court's substitution of an alter-
nate juror during deliberations did not violate the defendant's sixth
and fourteenth amendment jury trial rights. 62 Because the defend-
ant's counsel in Henderson examined the alternate juror before the
court allowed him to deliberate, and found his ability to make a fair
decision was unimpaired, "the essential feature of the jury was
preserved."
63
In Leser v. United States,'16 the Ninth Circuit held that, where the
defendants were present but did not object, a stipulation by the de-
156 Id. at 470-72.
157 La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 444 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
942 (1971).
158 United States v. Barone, 83 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. Fla. 1979). Accord, United States v.
Meinster, 484 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
159 650 F.2d at 122.
160 613 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1980).
161 650 F.2d at 126. In Johnson, Johnson was convicted of second degree murder in Indi-
ana. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court and the case was before the Seventh Cir-
cuit on a writ of habeas corpus.
162 613 F.2d at 175.
163 Id. at 179.
164 358 F.2d 313, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 802 (9th Cir. 1966).
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fendants' counsel allowing the substitution of an alternate juror dur-
ing deliberations was binding on the defendants,165 and did not
constitute double jeopardy. 166 The Ninth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Lamb 1 67 stated that a lack of objection by defendant's counsel
when the judge instructs an alternate juror to remain ready was not a
Leser stipulation. t68 The court stated further that if a court tempo-
rarily released the alternate juror from his jurors' obligations, after
the stand-by order and before the substitution, even a Leser stipula-
tion would be ineffective. The court held that, although the jury was
told to begin anew, the alternate juror's substitution during delibera-
tions was reversible error.'
69
The Fourth Circuit has adopted a negative view of substituting
alternate jurors who have attended prior deliberations. In United
States v. Chatman,170 the court regarded as plain error the presence of
an alternate juror in the jury room during the deliberations, even
though the defendant's counsel consented to the procedure.17 Like-
wise, in United States v. Virginia Erection Corp. ,172 relied upon by Chat-
man, the court overturned a jury verdict because the trial court had
allowed an alternate juror to retire with the jury. The Fourth Circuit
based the Virginia Erection decision on four grounds: (1) the defend-
165 Id. at 317. Not requiring an explicit knowing and intelligent waiver by the defendant,
as required for the waiver of constitutional rights, implies that the court considered this alter-
native a procedural violation, although not necessarily a constitutional violation. The dissent
in United States v. Lamb cited Leser as holding that the substitution process does not deprive a
defendant of his right to a full consideration of his case by an impartial jury panel. 529 F.2d
1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 1975).
166 358 F.2d at 318. The Sixth Circuit has also found the Leser rule persuasive. United
States v. Davis, 608 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1979).
167 529 F.2d at 1153.
168 Id. at 1157.
169 Id. The Ninth Circuit also spoke of the difficulties involved in such substitutions: the
coercive effect upon a substituted juror of a jury which has already decided the case, and its
limiting the accused's right to a mistrial because a juror may feign an illness rather than hang
a jury. Id at 1156. See WRIGHT, sutira note 5, at 53 n. 17.
The Leser rule was affirmed in United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1978).
The court in Lopez felt that Lamb may have undermined Leser. The dissent in Lamb stated
that Leser and Lamb read together produced a conclusive presumption of no prejudice when
there is an express waiver and a conclusive presumption of prejudice where there is no waiver.
529 F.2d at 1160. The majority in Lamb distinguished Leser on the grounds that there was no
stipulation, that counsel for the defendant did not object to the alternate jurors "standing-
by," that the original jury had reached a guilty verdict at one point, and that the alternate
juror was dismissed for a short while, being relieved of her jurors' obligation. Id. at 1157.
Lopez reinforces the court's adherence to the Lesser holding.
170 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir. 1978).
171 Id. at 1361.
172 335 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1964).
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ant must personally consent to the alternate juror's attending the de-
liberations; (2) the presence of the alternate juror violates FRCrimP
23 (b); (3) the alternate juror's mere presence violates the privacy and
secrecy of the jury and could affect the deliberations, and the court's
admonishment to the alternate juror not to participate did not cure
the error; and (4) the alternate juror's presence violates constitu-
tional provisions requiring a jury of exactly twelve members.
73
The Fourth Circuit has taken a less restrictive stance, however,
on the substitution during deliberations of an alternate juror who has
not attended prior jury deliberations. In United States v. Evans,'17 4 the
court recently allowed the substitution of a discharged alternate juror
during deliberations. Although his counsel advised to the contrary,
the defendant expressly consented to the procedure. 75 The court in
Evans also dismissed the alleged problems of missed prior delibera-
tions as conjecture.' 76 The implication of Chatman, Virginia Erection,
and Evans is that the Fourth Circuit does not consider the substitu-
tion during deliberations of an alternate juror who was absent from
the prior deliberations to be as prejudicial as the substitution during
deliberations of an alternate juror who was present during the prior
deliberations.
The Tenth Circuit is in general agreement with the Fourth Cir-
cuit's interpretation. In United States v. Beasle,'17 7 the court held that
the presence of alternate jurors during deliberations was plain error,
although it hedged as to the effect of the substitution during deliber-
ations of an alternate who had not attended the prior delibera-
tions. 178 The court stated that once the prescribed number of jurors
had become the jury, any other persons involved are strangers to the
'jury's" deliberations, and their presence in the jury room destroys
the sanctity and privacy of the jury. 179 The Tenth Circuit also, in
United States v. Baccari,180 upheld a stipulation by counsel and the
defendants that provided for the substitution of an alternate during
173 Id. at 870-72. The constitutional provisions the court found violated were Article III,
Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution and the sixth amendment. It has been noted by other
courts that the constitutional premise for the !irginiz Erection decision no longer exists. See,
e.g., Henderson, 613 F.2d at 177 n.5.
174 635 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1980).
175 Id. at 1127 n.3.
176 Id. at 1128.
177 464 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1972). See also Note, Rule 24(c),supra note 10 (case comment
on BearHq).
178 464 F.2d at 469.
179 Id. at 470.
180 489 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1973).
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deliberations, although the court based its decision on the stipula-
tion's having met the criteria for the waiver of constitutional jury
rights. 181
B. State Courts
1. Substitution During Deliberations of Alternate Jurors Absent
From the Prior Deliberations
State courts are increasingly willing to allow substitution during
deliberations of an alternate juror kept separate from the deliberat-
ingjurors. In People v. Collins,8 2 the California Supreme Court stated
that the state statute allowing alternate juror substitution during de-
liberations was to include a required instruction that the jury begin
deliberations anew upon the substitution. The court stressed that a
vital part of the jury trial right was for each juror to have engaged in
all of the deliberations.
8 3
Massachusetts and New Jersey have adopted the California ap-
proach, allowing substitution during deliberations only where the
"Collins instruction" has been given, 84 whereas Georgia allows sub-
stitution without a Collins instruction. The Georgia Supreme Court,
in Tanner v. State,8 5 noted the similarities between alternate jurors
and regular jurors, and stated that the substituted alternate juror
should listen and ask questions to understand the prior
deliberations.
8 6
The New York view, followed in Rhode Island 87 and Ken-
tucky,'8 is that substitution during deliberations is unconstitutional.
In People v. Ryan, 89 the New York Court of Appeals based its decision
on three grounds: (1) an alternate juror substitution results in a jury
of thirteen members, a violation of the New York constitution;
(2) the alternate juror missed the prior deliberations; and (3) the de-
181 Id. at 275 (defendants and counsel for both sides agreed to the procedure). See note 23
s.pra.
182 17 Cal. 3d 687, 552 P.2d 742, 131 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1976).
183 Id. at 694, 552 P.2d at 747, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 787. Collins was also followed in a
California civil action, Griesel v. Dart Indus., 23 Cal. 3d 578, 591 P.2d 503, 153 Cal. Rptr.
213 (1979).
184 Eg., Commonwealth v. Haywood, Mass. Adv. Sh. 965 (Apr. 5, 1979); State v. Trent,
79 N.J. 251, 257, 398 A.2d 1271, 1274 (1979) (plain error due to lack of jury instruction to
start anew); State v. Miller, 76 N.J. 392, 388 A.2d 218 (1978).
185 242 Ga. 437, 249 S.E.2d 238 (1978).
186 Id. at 437-38, 249 S.E.2d at 240.
187 State v. Berberian, 411 A.2d 308, 310 n.3 (R.I. 1980).
188 E.g., Woods v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 312, 152 S.W.2d 997 (1941).
189 19 N.Y.2d 100, 224 N.E.2d 710, 278 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1966).
NOTES
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
liberating jurors will probably have formulated preliminary posi-
tions, and any substantial agreement will be almost impossible for an
alternate juror to overcome. 90
2. Substitution During Deliberations of an Alternate Present
During the Prior Deliberations
Indiana is the only state that allows the substitution of alternate
jurors who are present during the deliberations prior to substitution.
Indiana's courts instruct the alternate jurors not to participate before
substitution.'19 The Indiana position rejects the view that the alter-
nate juror is a stranger to the jury whose presence during delibera-
tions results in prejudice to the defendant. 92 The Georgia position is
somewhat more restrictive than Indiana's, in that the state can over-
come the presumption of injury to the defendant from the presence
of alternate jurors during deliberations.1 93
The California position, on the other hand, is that the presence
of alternate jurors during deliberations violates the defendant's right
to a jury trial, 94 although an alternate juror's momentary and inad-
vertent presence before deliberations have begun will not invalidate
a verdict. 95 This position, however, may be changing. In People v.
Valles,' 96 the California Supreme Court held that "the presence of
alternates in the jury room during deliberations is not necessarily det-
rimental to a defendant's right to a jury trial . . . defense counsel
may stipulate to such procedure."'' 97 Valles thus overruled by impli-
cation an earlier appellate court case holding that the presence of
alternate jurors during deliberations so violated the jury trial right
that the consent of counsel could not render harmless the resulting
error. 198
190 Id. at 104, 224 N.E.2d at 712-13, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
191 See Minton v. State, 269 Ind. 39, 378 N.E.2d 639 (1978); Johnson v. State, 267 Ind.
256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (1977).
192 Johnson v. State, 267 Ind. at 259-60, 369 N.E.2d at 625.
193 See Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 486, 220 S.E.2d 448 (1975) (twelve jurors signed affida-
vits that they were unaffected by the alternate juror's presence; presumption overcome).
194 See People v. Adame, 36 Cal. App. 3d 402, 111 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1973); People v. Brit-
ton, 4 Cal. 2d 622, 52 P.2d 217 (1935); People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. 2d 75, 40 P.2d 891
(1935); Comment, People v. Bruneman, supra note 39, at 123.
195 See People v. French, 12 Cal. 2d 720, 87 P.2d 1014, rev'don other grounds, People v.
Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 169 P.2d 1 (1946). Accord, People v. Rhodes, 38 Ill. 2d 389, 231
N.E.2d 400 (1967).
196 24 Cal. 3d 121, 593 P.2d 240, 154 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1979).
197 Id. at 125, 593 P.2d at 242, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
198 People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. 2d at 79-81, 40 P.2d at 893-94.
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The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Cuzick, 199 held that
an alternate juror's presence during deliberations is a substantial in-
trusion on the right of the jury to deliberate in private, and was
therefore prejudicial. The court considered the alternate juror a
stranger to the deliberations. 200 North Carolina follows Cuzick, 201 but
holds no error results if the alternate juror is present momentarily
and inadvertently in the jury room before deliberations have begun,
and the judge determines that deliberations have not begun.
20 2
IV. Conclusion
A stipulation by the parties allowing the substitution during de-
liberations of alternate jurors who are either present or absent during
the prior deliberations is preferrable but rare, because defendants be-
lieve that a retrial is in their best interests. Because of the expense,
delay and court congestion, however, retrials are in no one's best in-
terests, particularly in trials of longer duration where alternate jurors
are normally used.
Nevertheless, judicial economy and efficiency should not sacri-
fice the jury trial rights of parties. Thus, substitution during deliber-
ations, whether the alternate jurors are present or absent during the
prior deliberations, are excellent available options. When the trial
court administers these procedures pursuant to certain guidelines,
they protect the parties' interests in their jury trial right and promote
the efficient administration of justice.
A judge should, in his discretion, decide whether to allow alter-
nate juror substitution during deliberations where the alternate juror
does not attend the prior deliberations. The judge presided over the
entire trial, and can determine if prejudicial effect is a real possibil-
ity. The court should not relieve the alternate juror of his obligations
as a juror, whether he is sequestered or allowed to go home. Prior to
199 85 Wash. 146, 530 P.2d 288 (1975).
200 530 P.2d at 289. Accord, Berry v. State, 298 So. 2d 491 (Fla. App. 1974); State High-
way Comm'n v. Dunks, 166 Mont. 239, 531 P.2d 1316 (1975) (civil case); Brigman v.
Oklahoma, 350 P.2d 321 (Okla. Cr. App. 1960); Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa. Super. 516,
67 A.2d 746 (1949); Patten v. State, 221 Tenn. 337, 426 S.W.2d 503 (1968).
The Washington Supreme Court in Cuzick also found its statute requiring dismissal of
alternate jurors upon submission of the case to the jury was violated when the alternate jurors
were not dismissed, and by itself this violation was sufficient to vitiate the verdict. 85 Wash.
2d 146, 530 P.2d 288, 289 (1975). Accord, Woods v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. at 312, 152
S.W.2d at 997; Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa. Super. at 576, 67 A.2d at 647; Patten v.
State, 221 Tenn. at 337, 426 S.W.2d at 503.
201 See State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 220 S.E.2d 521, 531 (1975).
202 220 S.E.2d at 534-35.
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substitution, the court should also conduct a careful voir dire of the
alternate juror to determine if he has been subject to any im-
permissable outside influence and can still make a fair decision. A
court should require the discharged juror to submit to a voir dire,
including a physicial examination if the juror alleges an illness, unless
the illness requires immediate hospitalization. The voir dire ensures
that the necessity for discharge exists. The court should further in-
struct the regular jurors to begin deliberations anew, or to summarize
to the alternate juror the extent of the deliberations to that point. As
an added precaution, the court could voir dire the regular jurors to
determine if they could begin deliberations anew, summarize the
prior deliberations, or keep an open mind as to any criticisms or ar-
guments the alternate juror may have.
If the judge allows an alternate juror to be present during the
deliberations before substitution is made, a preliminary voir dire
could be used to determine if the alternate juror's presence would
inhibit any juror during the deliberations. Because the alternate ju-
ror is with the regular jurors throughout the trial, the problem of
outside influence is greatly reduced. The court should, however, con-
duct a precautionary voir dire before the alternate juror is substi-
tuted to determine if he is capable of making a fair decision.
Although perhaps unnecessary, the voir dire will help allay any
doubts a party might have as to the alternate juror's objectivity. The
court should also voir dire any regular juror seeking a discharge to
ensure a necessity for discharge exists. As a final precaution, al-
though unnecessary, the court could ask the regular jurors if they
would seriously consider the substituted juror's arguments and
viewpoints.
By adopting the above procedures, legislatures and courts can
improve the efficiency of the administration of justice without jeop-
ardizing the parties' constitutional rights. Adopting procedures that
combine justice and judicial efficiency is an important goal,203 as
Chief Justice Burger has recognized:
If we want to improve the administration of justice in this country,
we must try some things some lawyers and judges may not find
convenient or agreeable. . . . Our thinking must be imaginative,
innovative, and dynamic, and we must experiment and search con-
stantly for better ways, always remembering that our objective is
fairness and justice, not efficiency for its own sake.204
203 Set note 112 and accompanying text supra.
204 See Burger, supra note 112, at 1127-28.
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Courts should adopt and legislatures should enact procedures provid-
ing for the substitution of alternate jurors during deliberations, for
they achieve the important combined goals of justice and judicial
efficiency.
Jon D. Ehlinger
